

A COMPARISON OF THE LIBERIA AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO SECOND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

FRANCIS OBODAI LOKKO¹ & CHRISTIANA NAA MOMO LOKKO²

¹Chaplain-Directorate of Religious Affairs, Ghana Armed Forces, Ghana

²Senior Lecturer-Mathematics, Statistics and Actuarial Science Department, Takoradi Technical University, Ghana

ABSTRACT

The concept of Conflict Resolution was initiated by the UN after WWII to in International Politics to help resolve conflicts around the world including Africa. Despite numerous studies on conflict resolution on the various efforts to resolve conflict in Africa little research has been done to compare Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) second conflict resolution. There is therefore the need to close the existing gap regarding conflict theory and empirical evidence in the comparison of the conflict resolution during Liberia and the DRC second conflicts to enhance better understanding of why one conflict was resolve with one peace agreement whilst the other conflict took more than one agreements to bring sustainable peace. The study, therefore, seeks to compare conflict resolution mechanisms in the second conflicts of Liberia and the DRC and the implications for conflict resolution initiatives in Africa. The study employed a qualitative research methodology. The qualitative research methodology examines secondary data from publications on the second conflicts and conflict resolution initiatives of Liberia and the DRC. The Liberia and the DRC conflict resolution suggest parties in conflicts should be allowed to choose preferred mediators during the negotiation, peace keeping and peace agreement process to facilitate sustainable peace. The Liberia conflict was resolved through the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement whilst in the DRC conflict, took more than them three different peace agreements for sustainable peace. In inclusion, all parties in the conflict zone should be involved in conflict resolution process to help implement the peace agreement for sustainable peace.

KEYWORDS: Conflict Resolution Initiatives, Mediation, Negotiation, Peacekeeping and Peace Agreement.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of Conflict Resolution was initiated by the UN after WWII to help resolve conflicts around the world (Kazanský, 2015). The concept rests on various pillars and depends on the nature of the conflict and the conflict resolution initiatives required resolving each unique conflict, such as the Liberia and the DRC second conflicts. The Liberia second conflict of 1999 was triggered by alienation of certain ethnic groups, leading to the emergence of two new warring factions after the election of Charles Taylor (Kotia, 2015). The DRC second conflict of 1998 was caused by the ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi aligned forces. The work compares the cause of conflict and the resolution of the Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo second conflicts.

The work is organized into five main themes; namely background of the study, statement of problem, objective of the study, methodology of the study, method of data collection, method of data analysis, comparison of the root causes of

the second conflicts of Liberia and the DRC, comparison of conflict resolution initiatives during the second conflicts of Liberia and the DRC and draw lessons from Liberia and the DRC second conflicts. The relevance of the work to the study is the application of the outcome to amplify the conflict resolution intervention in the Liberia and the DRC second conflicts thereby drawing lessons and conclusion to improve upon conflict resolution initiatives in the future (Mlambo & Dliamnin, 2019).

LITERATURE REVIEW

The end of the Cold War and the Post-Cold War era brought to the fore a new stream of conflicts in Africa (Essuman-Johnson, 2009). The breakdown of the ideological mind-set and the structures of the global alliances created ethnic and political tensions in some African countries (Abdallah, 2005). One of the highest periods of civil wars was 1991 and 1992 when the world experienced seventeen ongoing civil wars (Annan, 2014). Africa experienced violent conflicts than other continents; albeit the struggle for conflict resolution initiatives is experienced across the world (Achankeng, 2013). The detrimental effects of such conflicts and the implications for the economies and security of many African states have compelled African leaders to find the best way of resolving conflicts in Africa (Mlambo & Dliamnin, 2019).

The study compared conflict resolution initiatives in the second conflicts of Liberia and the DRC. The study highlighted the elements which determined the success in Liberia and failure in the DRC. The success or failure of conflict resolution initiatives in the second conflicts of Liberia and the DRC, respectively, provide the justification to study and understand the reasons certain conflicts are easily resolved whilst others linger on for a long time. Although opinions differ on why conflict resolution efforts yield disparate results, factors considered for the difference in results include the causes of the conflicts, the actors in the conflicts and the resolution initiatives employed to resolve the conflicts. The study, therefore, seeks to investigate the causes conflict and conflict of resolution in the second conflicts of Liberia and the DRC, and the implications for conflict resolution initiatives in Africa.

Few studies have attempted to compare the conflict resolution processes among two countries within different sub-regions such as the DRC and Sierra Leone (Demirag, 2014) to assess the strengths and weaknesses in the resolution initiatives. A comparative examination of conflict resolution in Angola and South Africa (Gounden & Solomon, 2016), Kenya and Zimbabwe (Ikejiaku & Dauda, 2011) has been conducted to further understand conflict resolution strategies in Africa but not that of Liberia and the DRC. The international community has raised a lot of concerns over the reasons conflict resolution initiatives adopted in certain war-torn countries have been largely successful whilst others have not (Abdul-Mumuni, 2007). Although experts have scrutinized the subject of the second conflicts of Liberia and the DRC, there remain certain issues which have not been adequately understood and dealt with.

The first issue is the inadequate comparative research analysis of the root causes of conflicts in a country where resolution initiatives have been successful and a country where the initiatives have not worked (Abdul-Mumuni, 2007; Daines & Laker, 2010; Karbo & Mutisi, 2012; Kotia, 2012). The lack of in-depth knowledge of the root causes of conflicts and the effects of the causes on the success or the failure of the conflict resolution process has led to a gap in conflict resolution literature. The study, therefore, sought to discuss the causes of the second conflicts in Liberia and the DRC and to ascertain whether the causes of conflicts played any role in the success and failure of the conflicts in Liberia and the DRC, respectively.

Secondly, the study focuses on the lack of research on the comparative examination of the conflict resolution strategies employed in the second conflict that was successfully resolved and a conflict that was not resolved. Furthermore, research has not been conducted with Conflict Theory and Conflict Resolution Theory on the comparative analysis of conflict resolution initiatives in two sub-regional countries but not a comparison of Liberia and DRC second conflicts (Demirag, 2014; Obi, 2012). Hence, the need arises to compare the conflict resolution initiatives in a resolved conflict to an unresolved conflict to assess whether the initiatives played a role in the success or failure of the resolution. The study, therefore, sought to provide a better understanding of causes of conflicts and conflict resolution in Africa by comparing a country in the West African sub-region and another in Southeast Central Africa to address the current gap in theory and practice in conflict resolution in Africa. Overall, the study sought to examine the conflict resolution in the second conflicts of Liberia and the DRC to make proposals on how to intervene differently in conflicts across different settings in Africa for sustainable peace.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- What is the conflict resolution initiatives employed in the second conflicts in Liberia and the DRC?

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

General Objective

The general objective of the study is to examine Conflict Resolution employed in the Liberia and the DRC second conflicts to understand the Conflict Resolution process during the Liberia and the DRC second conflicts, and make recommendations to improve on the concept of Conflict Resolution in Africa.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

The specific objectives of the study are:

- To evaluate the conflict resolution initiatives employed in the second conflicts in Liberia and the DRC.
- To draw lessons for future conflict resolution for sustainable peace in Africa.

METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

Methodology refers to the overall approach to the research procedure (Neuman, 2007). The study employed a qualitative research methodology. The qualitative research methodology examines secondary data from publications on the second conflicts of Liberia and the DRC. Qualitative research is not concerned with numerical representation but a deeper understanding of a problem (Howitt & Cramer, 2008). In content qualitative research, the researcher is both the subject and the object of the research. The objective of the qualitative content methodology is to produce in-depth and illustrative information to understand the various dimensions of the problem under analysis (Neuman, 2007). The section discusses the research method and design, study area, study population, the method of data collection and the method of data analysis.

RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN

The study employed a case study approach due to the significant advantage associated with case study research. Case study is a social science research approach that aims to bring out unique characteristics and interesting differences in the situation under observation. Case study research allows in-depth review of new or unclear phenomena whilst retaining the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events. Case study suits the study because the study sought to highlight a set of

decisions, why the decisions were taken, how the decisions were implemented and with what result (Creswell, 2007; Neuman, 2007; Silverman, 2004). The second conflicts of Liberia and the DRC were chosen as cases because the two conflicts were compared from the lenses of Conflict Resolutions Theory. The methodology suited the current study since the comparison of conflict resolution interventions in Liberia and the DRC are unique. An understanding of the circumstances surrounding the successful resolution of the Liberian conflict and the failure of the DRC conflict provides insight on how to avoid similar mistakes in the future. The study focused solely on past occurrences and events relating to the conflict resolution process which helped to resolve the causes of the conflicts by scrutinizing documents on the period.

METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

Data collection is the process of gathering and measuring information on variables of interest in a systematic fashion to enable a researcher to answer research questions, test hypotheses and evaluate outcomes. The data collection component of research is common to all fields of study including physical and social sciences, humanities and business. Whilst methods vary by discipline, the emphasis on ensuring accurate and honest collection remains the same. The study relied on the interpretation of written documents, reports and other sources. The sources of data for any given study are classified under two broad categories, namely primary and secondary data (Silverman, 2004). The primary source of data is defined as data collected directly for the first time. Secondary data, on the other hand, is the data already collected or produced by other scholars (Majid, 2018). The study relied on the interpretation of written documents and reports, among other sources. To achieve the objective of the study, secondary data was used to compare the two conflicts and the resolution process. Accordingly, the study assessed and analysed information relating to the Liberia and the DRC second conflicts. Secondary data was sourced from books, journals, articles, reports and other electronic sources including the United Nations (UN), Africa Union (AU), Economic Community West of African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Committee (SADC). Most of the books, reports and documents relating to the concept of conflict resolution were obtained from the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) library, Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFSCS) library and additional information was obtained from Internet sources.

METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

Data analysis is the systematic application of statistical and/or logical techniques to describe and illustrate, condense, recap and evaluate data. Various analytic procedures provide a way of drawing inductive inferences from data and distinguishing the phenomenon of interest from the statistical fluctuations present in the data (Silverman, 2004). Content analysis was used to organize the secondary data. Content analysis is one of the statistical tools widely and successfully used in several research areas including information and health science (Silverman, 2004). One advantage of content analysis is the provision of valuable historical and cultural insights over time through text analysis. Content analysis provides an unobtrusive means of analysis and focuses directly on communication via texts or transcripts and, hence, gets at the central aspect of social interaction (Creswell, 2007). The study adopted content analysis to address the research questions and relied on books, articles, websites and other periodicals published on conflicts and conflict resolution. The data gathered in the documents was grouped into themes based on the objectives of the study. Some of the themes included: root causes of conflicts, main actors in conflicts and the conflict resolution initiatives. Each of the themes was broken down into subthemes based on the theories underpinning the study. The researcher considered poverty, ethnic factor, corruption and bad governance, human rights violation and natural resource factor under root causes of conflicts. Additionally, for conflict resolution initiatives, themes such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration, peacekeeping and peace agreements were considered.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework emphasizes several theories used to describe Conflict Theory and Conflict Resolution Theory (Suleymanov, 2017). The study employed Conflict Resolution Theory to explain the conflict resolution in the second conflicts of Liberia and the DRC. After Liberia and the DRC governments failed to halt the conflicts and the brutalities meted out to the people, the international community intervened by using various conflict resolution initiatives such as mediation, negotiation and peacekeeping to avoid mass atrocities and human rights violations. The researcher employed the Conflict Resolution Theory to explain the causes of conflicts, the actors in conflicts and the conflict resolution in the second conflicts of Liberia and the DRC.

Wanis & Ghais (2014) focus on International Conflict Resolution which seeks to prevent, reduce and transform potential or actual violence within and between states to a peaceful end. Conflict resolution stipulates a body of knowledge, practices, norms and institutions are tasked to prevent, reduce and transform potential or actual violent conflicts within and between states to a peaceful end to rebuild societies. The pathways of contemporary international conflict resolution practice are dispersed with success and failures which cost human life. Wanis & Ghais (2014) consider perennial debates concerning the causes of international conflicts and international conflict resolution to peace and agree several tools exist which conflicting parties and third parties use which are independent of interaction with the UN and regional organizations. The authors present prevention of conflict, negotiation and problem-solving workshops, mediation, peacekeeping and peace agreements as tools in resolving international conflicts.

Wanis & Ghais (2014) state mediation and negotiation form part of the first line of International Conflict Resolution process. Mediation involves offering rewards or making threat to the parties to understand the different outcomes. The authors suggest formulative and manipulative mediation are more successful in reaching agreements and facilitative styles are more successful in calming tensions and reducing the chances of future conflicts or crises. The situation of no neutral mediators combined with the possibility of manipulative mediation makes the distinction between mediation and other third-party roles difficult. When a third party supports one side of a conflict and employs military or economic aid to bring about a particular outcome, the mediator must point out the implication to the conflict process. The role of a mediator is to reach a voluntary agreement without employing force to blend with the rules of international laws or norms. The use of mediation and negotiation in international conflict resolution remains challenging in inter-state and intra-state conflicts.

International negotiations involve dynamics at the interpersonal and inter organizational levels. Negotiation involves vast diplomatic bureaucracies, the possibility of military coercion and the influence of transnational and non-state actors. The influences of international events have impact on negotiations. In the post-Cold War period, a higher proportion of civil wars have been settled through negotiation than before. Civil wars raise questions about parties having the legitimate right to negotiation. Increasingly, negotiations involve not only armed groups but unarmed civil society organizations and political parties though such parties often serve in a consultative or observer role rather than as full negotiating parties. Wanis & Ghais (2014) assert mediation involves a third party's help when the conflicting parties have difficulty in settling civil conflicts. Mediators are other states, the UN, International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), local or international Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs), religious organizations, eminent individuals or a combination of such actors. In 2006, the UN created the Mediation Support Unit, followed by the Standby Team of Mediation Experts in 2008 to move away from reliance on sporadic, ad hoc mediation and mediators. Eminent individuals

often are former high-level personalities. While the “mediator” is more often an entity larger than an individual, usually one key person such as a head of state or a special representative to the Secretary-General is appointed to chair the plenary sessions and head the mediation team (Wanis & Ghais, 2014).

Wanis & Ghais (2014) state the UN and other regional bodies across the globe use peacekeeping as a conflict resolution strategy. Peacekeeping ensures maintenance of peace within and among nations and communities. Peacekeeping employs international military force presence as a third party to bring peace and other activities that tend to create a situation favouring lasting peace. The process of peacekeeping as a conflict resolution strategy involves monitoring and observing peace processes. In addition, peacekeeping aims at creating a secured environment within which the conflict dispute is resolved. Hence, peacekeeping is a confidence building mechanism to ensure conflicting parties agree on ceasefire through signing and implementation of a peace agreement (Wanis & Ghais, 2014).

Peace agreement is another conflict resolution method involving multiple states and non-state actors in helping to mediate conflicts. Peace agreements contact actors in conflict resolution to provide support for resolving conflicts and implementing agreements (Wanis & Ghais, 2014). The process of peace agreement sets out several critical tasks of which effective implementation remains key to the success of the peace process. Data on the conflict resolution initiatives discussed above helped in reviewing literature on the second conflicts of Liberia and the DRC.

The Theory of Conflict Resolution contributes to the understanding of conflict resolution. The theory explains the reason the international community must intervene in the conflicts in Liberia and the DRC to find lasting peace. The international community intervenes in conflicts to bring sustainable peace to countries. Further, the theory sheds light on the reason the UN and regional bodies intervened in the Liberia and the DRC conflicts through various initiatives. The Theory of Conflict Resolution helped the study to explain the conflict resolution concept employed in the conflicts in the two countries. The overall relevance of the Theory of Conflict Resolution to the study is that the theory provided an explanation for the reason the UN and other regional bodies reacted differently to similar situations in ending the conflicts.

Comparison of Conflict Resolution during the Second Conflicts in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo

The conflict resolution initiatives employed in the Liberia and the DRC second conflicts were numerous. The conflict resolution initiatives included mediation, negotiation, peacekeeping, and peace agreements.

Mediation Role

Wanis & Ghais (2014) state that mediation involves state or non-state actors as third parties to help conflicting parties having difficulties in the settlement of conflicts. The third parties include countries, the UN, IGOs, local or international NGOs, religious organizations, eminent individuals acting alone or a combination of such actors. Mediation attempts to reconcile opposite parties to accept mutual grounds and avoid anger developed by the contending parties. The mediators have the choice to either impose own solutions on the disputing parties but are expected to take a strong initiative to propose formulas to bring peace.

The Liberia second conflict broke out despite the massive investment in human and financial resources ECOWAS made to bring peace in the first conflict under Taylor’s rule in 1999 (Olonisakin, 2010). All efforts made by the Liberian Inter-Faith Mediation Committee, the National Conference of All Liberian Political Parties, Patriotic Fronts, Interest Groups and Concerned Citizens to end the hostilities proved futile because the warring parties were unable to reach a consensus (Abdul-Mumuni, 2007). An additional mediation momentum came from ECOWAS, AU, UN and other

international bodies to facilitate peace talks during the second conflict (Rocha, 2009). A separate initiative was a peace conference convened by the Liberia Leadership Forum which agreed with ECOWAS, AU and the UN to serve as lead mediators to ensure peace (Hayner, 2007). The various parties in conflict met in Akosombo and Accra in Ghana from 4th June to 18th August, 2003 for mediation of the Liberia crisis within the framework of the ECOWAS Peace Process. The ECOWAS Chairman, His Excellency John Agyekum Kufuor, President of the Republic of Ghana, and the main mediator, General Abdulsalami Abubakat, former Head of State of Nigeria, were at the meeting (Effah-Apenteng, 2003). The most significant outcome of the ECOWAS mediation held in Accra was the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2003 between the government of Liberia, LURD, MODEL and political parties. Unlike previous agreements, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement made room for the involvement of civil society groups in the negotiations and subsequent inclusion in the transitional government. The agreement simplified the formation of a government of national unity which led the country's general elections in October 2005 (Atuobi, 2011). The success of the mediation was attributed to the determination of West African leaders committed to lasting peace, the inclusion of civil society organizations in the peace building process, combined efforts of ECOWAS and UN peacekeeping force sustained peace in Liberia.

In the DRC, various mediators such as former President Sir Ketumile Masire of Botswana were appointed to facilitate the process in December 1999 (Carayannis, 2009). However, the parties in the conflict accepted Togolese Prime Minister Edem Kodjo to mediate the crisis, with the backing of SADC and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to lead the mediation and the negotiation process (Demirag, 2014). The escalating violence between rival Rwandan and Ugandan proxy forces in the east prompted the appointment of two UN Special Envoys which played a proactive mediation role. Familiar with the region's geopolitics, the former Senegalese Prime Minister and seasoned politician, Mustafa Nyasse, and a former Eritrean diplomat, Haile Menkerios, were appointed to mediate. The appointment of the two personalities resulted in the Pretoria Agreement brokered by Mustafa Nyasse and Thabo Mbeki in December 2002 and the establishment of an all-inclusive framework for the transitional government of national unity in 2003. The Pretoria Agreement corrected the failures of Sun City, as both Nyasse and Mbeki recognized the power realities between Kinshasa and Kigali were not ignorable. The DRC accepted Togo as mediator because the Ugandan mediation in the DRC could not be neutral (Carayannis, 2009). Uganda was involved in the dispute and played a warring party role. According to the UN and other organizations, Uganda supported the rebels on many occasions. The Togolese leader's strong motivation and interest helped the mediation process. Apart from the secondary warring parties' involvement in the peace talks, the inclusion of all other armed groups was necessary to end all conflicts in the DRC. The DRC rebels were the biggest and most challenging among the armed groups (Demirag, 2014). The mediators in the DRC peace process established a joint military commission to hold diverse motives in the mediation (Ogechi, 2008). The UN and the AU mediation signed the Goma Agreement on 23rd March, 2009, which called for the government to pass an amnesty law for former rebels (Carayannis, 2009).

In both Liberia and the DRC, formal and informal diplomatic mediation initiatives were employed. The mediators were African-led efforts launched by groups of nearby states, influential heads of states, regional organizations in and outside the country. The regional bodies, UN, Western governments, and international organizations influenced the mediation process, focusing on the establishment of a ceasefire, freezing of the territorial control of all conflict parties, deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Liberia and the DRC. The mediators in the Liberia conflict were able to include items left in the previous agreements with the consent of all parties in conflict

Negotiation Role

Negotiations are the process whereby the parties within a conflict seek to resolve differences (Schellenberg, 1996). International negotiations involve certain dynamics of the interpersonal and inter-organizational levels where compromises are reached to avoid argument and dispute (Wanis & Ghais, 2014). Negotiation involves vast diplomatic bureaucracies, the possibility of military coercion and the influence of state and non-state actors. In the Liberia second conflict, the government, LURD and Movement for Democracy in Liberia were central to the negotiation process to agree to ceasefire, peace agreement and the implementation of the peace agreement (Hayner, 2007:7). During the ceasefire negotiations at the beginning of the Accra talks, the actors negotiated directly with each other without the involvement of civil society or other parties. However, towards the end, civil society was involved in the negotiation (Atuobi, 2011).

Despite the fact that the warring factions held considerable power to set the terms of the peace agreement, the agreement did not include an amnesty for past crimes, explicitly leaving a gap for future consideration (Chear et al., 2003). Issues of accountability emerged early in the negotiations, shortly after the ceasefire agreement was signed. The proposal for a war crimes tribunal pushed by civil society representatives was postponed and representatives of the rebel factions initially demanded justice for the Taylor government. The negotiator General Abubakar reminded the rebel factions the call for justice could stir war crime accusations against the rebels, thus, the representatives of the rebel factions became cautious about the call for justice. During the negotiations, parties discussed a means to reform the judiciary through the appointment of temporary judges. Hence, all Supreme Court justices deemed to have resigned with the signing of the peace agreement were reappointed. The reappointment of the justices became necessary since the serving judges, appointed by Charles Taylor, were considered partial. Thereafter, new judicial appointments were agreed to be made from a shortlist the National Bar Association provided. In order to keep the judiciary free from political influence, the negotiations barred the interim justices from contesting elective offices during the 2005 elections. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Ghana in 2003 involved many actors to get the document signed to bring peace to Liberia (Chear et al., 2003). The political party representative played a central role in the talks to ensure the points accepted during the negotiation process were implemented. Before the indictment, various Liberian religious leaders prepared the roadmap for talks with Charles Taylor to agree to go into self-exile (Hayner, 2007). Charles Taylor's further agreement not to participate in the elections contributed to the success of the conflict resolution process in Liberia.

The DRC second conflict was complex as the conflict involved a vast array of actors, interests and issues which affected the negotiation process (Demirag, 2014; Koko, 2016). When the warring parties agreed to a ceasefire, negotiations became the other viable option to end the war. Conscious of the significance and role of civil society in the country, the facilitation team of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue led by former Botswana President Ketumile Masire with support from all belligerents agreed to the participation of civil society in the peace negotiations held in South Africa in 2002–2003 (Rogier, 2004). The role civil society played during the conflict resolution was not only the mobilization for negotiations to resolve the conflict, but the denunciation of human rights abuses and crimes committed by all belligerents. The ability of civil society to denounce the abuses served as an advocacy tool toward the international community's decisive intervention in the DRC (Cheung, 2010).

However, a new era emerged following the assassination of Laurent-Désiré Kabila on 16th January 2001 and Kabila's replacement with Joseph Kabila. In contrast to a predecessor reluctant to negotiate directly with the rebels, Joseph Kabila lifted all obstacles preventing the launch of an all-inclusive negotiation process designed to end the war. As an

uncontested national stakeholder, all warring and political parties accepted civil society as a critical participant in the different phases of the peace negotiation process that ended the second DRC war (Demirag, 2014). The early initiatives targeted the warring parties and emphasized securing a ceasefire, a precondition for direct political negotiations among all major Congolese socio-political stakeholders. In context, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, signed on 10th July, 1999, represented a significant breakthrough, though remaining dormant for nearly three years whilst the war continued. The situation changed in January 2001 following Joseph Kabila's presidency. Under Kabila's leadership, government committed to upholding the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and lent the necessary support to the facilitation team under former President Ketumile Masire for the organization of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue provided for in the aforesaid agreement.

The negotiations were reconvened in South Africa in September 2002, paving the way for the signing of the Global and Inclusive Agreement on 17th December, 2002. Although all groupings making up the Congolese civil society agreed to the principle of negotiations as the only mechanism to resolve the conflict, the groupings were unable to resolve the internal cleavages permanently. Throughout the negotiation process, all parties fought for the inclusion of civil society groups and opposition political parties to be part of the negotiations. Hence, direct involvement of civil society in the negotiations was important in the conflict resolution process in the DRC.

In the negotiation processes of Liberia and the DRC, the parties in the conflict decided on the selection of the appropriate negotiators. Furthermore, in the Liberia and the DRC negotiations, the major warring factions and the government were at the negotiations from the beginning to the end. However, in Liberia, the Judicial Service was dissolved in the negotiation process and Charles Taylor was asked to hand over power to an interim president whilst in the DRC negotiations, Joseph Kabila was to share power with the rebel groups, an agreement all parties accepted. Literature suggests negotiation has been the commonest conflict resolution initiative in Africa (Gounden, 2011). The negotiations have involved both internal and external negotiators (Isajiw, 2000). Similar situations have occurred in Somalia, Uganda, Chad, Niger, Southern Sahara, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Zimbabwe (Anderlini, 2004; Gounden, 2011).

Peacekeeping Role

Peacekeeping employs international military forces, police and civilian presence as a third party to bring peace (Neef, 2017). Peacekeeping entails activities which tend to create an atmosphere for lasting peace (Kotia, 2015; Wanis & Ghais, 2014). Peacekeeping operations have become a standard feature of UN's work in warring countries including Liberia and the DRC, falling between Chapters 6 and 7 of the UN Charter (Anderlini, 2004). Article 39 of the UN Charter mandates the UN SC to maintain peace and security in the world. Hence, the interest behind the UN sanctioning peacekeeping in Liberia and the DRC (Haász, 2018).

In the Liberia second conflict, ECOWAS mandated ECOMOG to restore law and order to ensure respect for human rights through peacekeeping. On 4th August, 2003, ECOMIL, led by Nigeria deployed peacekeepers to stop the atrocities, guarantee security, freedom of movement of humanitarian agencies, security sector reforms and form the nucleus of an International Stabilization Forces to be deployed later (Kotia, 2015; Yoroms, 2016). In view of the mandate, on 11th September, 2003, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended the deployment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia. The UN Security Council approved Resolution 1509 on 19th September, 2003, of 15,000 UN peacekeepers deployment in Liberia to end the atrocities (Neef, 2017; Kotia, 2015). The UN slowly built up forces and worked in the country to disarm the various factions with the implementation of the peace agreement mandates (Anderlini,

2004). The transformation of ECOMOG in UNMIL shows how ECOWAS and was ready to intervene to avert atrocities. But, ECOWAS lacked resources to fully complete the task, enhance the UN support for the operations. There have been similar incidences in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire where ECOMOG and the United Nations Mission were used to bring peace to these countries (McCandless & Karbo, 2011).

In the DRC second conflict, the regional powerbrokers mediating the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement recognized the limitations of the implementation of the agreement without peacekeeping force on ground (Carayannis, 2009). The United Nations Security Council resolution 1234, was adopted unanimously on 9 April 1999, after expressing concerns at the situation in DRC and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Kasanda, 1999). The UN Council demanded an immediate halt to hostilities in the region, and a withdrawal of all foreign forces and the establishment of the government authority to constitute, facilitate, and deploy an appropriate peacekeeping force to the DRC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in collaboration with the AU (Kasanda, 1999). South Africa contributed 1,268 personnel to MONUC, and provided financial, human and logistical support for the peacekeeping (Dainesa & Laker, 2010). The AU appointed the Joint Military Commission to ensure compliance with the ceasefire. The signatories of the agreement required the mission to have both peacekeeping and peace enforcement mandate to end the atrocities.

Thus, the direction and capacity of MONUC peacekeepers reinforced civilian protection while the deployment of an EU bridging force to ensure peace until more peacekeepers arrived, had mixed results. The UN Security Council authorized a troop increase of 3000 (Carayannis, 2009). The foregoing discussions support claims that Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Central African Republic, Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and other countries have at various periods benefitted from peacekeeping operations (Aboagye, 2001). The Peacekeeping missions were carried out with UN and EU support. The findings suggest several engagements of peacekeepers have been carried in Africa with support from the international community (Modola, 2019). In both Liberia and the DRC, peacekeeping missions started by regional organizations and culminated into a UN-led mission due to lack of resources from the regional bodies and AU (Dainesa & Laker, 2010; Kotia, 2015; Yoroms, 2016). In Liberia, Nigeria played the leading role whilst in the DRC, South Africa played the leading role both in personnel and resources before the UN Mission was deployed. Arguably, peacekeeping forces helped reduce the violence in Liberia and the DRC by monitoring belligerents' behaviour in the conflicts (Smidt, 2020). Peacekeeping facilitated effective communication among actors in conflicts to ensure peace for democratic structures in Liberia and the DRC. However, ECOMOG peacekeepers in Liberia turned into UN peacekeepers whilst in the DRC, existing peacekeepers were increase to meet the task on ground. Future AU peacekeeping needs to raise own funds for mission or collaborate with the UN to response quickly to crisis.

Peace Agreements Role

Peace agreements identify the natural stands of parties in conflicts through effective communication (Schellenberg, 1999). Peace agreements allow parties to voice concerns and outline the kind of agreement to work with (Wanis&Ghais, 2014). In the settlement of civil conflicts, the tasks are grouped into four categories political, military, economic and social. In the Liberia second conflict, peace agreement was one of the conflict resolution initiatives to end the conflict. Liberian factions reached a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, Ghana on 18th August, 2003 (Kotia, 2015). The Accord laid the basis for a Transitional Government of Liberia mandated to oversee the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration process and prepare the country for elections in two years (Herbert, 2014). The Accra Comprehensive Agreement signed in 2003 made provision for the reorganization of the police, immigration and other security agencies to include combatants

from the various warring factions (Herbert, 2014; Obi, 2012). Liberia's government, rebels and political parties signed a peace agreement to end the atrocities. It also called for the release of prisoners and abductees, and addressed human rights and political issues (Nilsson, 2003). The peace agreement addressed a post-conflict rehabilitation programme and the settlement of disputes (Anderlini, 2004).

In the DRC, various peace agreements helped to bring peace but did not end the conflict. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999), the Sun City Agreement (April 2002), the Pretoria Agreement (July 2002) and the Luanda Agreement (September 2002) contributed to the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement of December 2002. The agreements did not successfully curb violence in many parts of the DRC but served as instrumental pillars for the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement which ended the Second Congo War. The agreement led to the formation of a unified Transitional Government of the DRC in 2003 (Ahere, 2012). The road to Sun City II agreement was to end the Rwandan and the rebel allies of the Rally for Congolese Democracy Liberation Movement which threatened to capture Kinshasa, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Chad for Kabila. Joseph Kabila was made a non-executive president and Bemba the first vice-president.

The Liberia conflict was resolved through the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement whilst in the DRC conflict, it took four more peace agreements combined in the process for sustainable peace. Furthermore, during the signing of the Liberia Peace Agreement, signatories requested Charles Taylor to leave the country but in the DRC, the signatories requested Joseph Kabila to share power with the various groups, leading to the formation of the Unified Transition of the DRC in 2003. Nevertheless, in both countries, the peace agreements laid foundations for the formation of transitional governments for peace to prevail. Peace agreement must consider power-sharing to settle the political, military, territorial, ethnic, religious and economic crisis in Africa. Power-sharing affected the signing and implementation of the agreement in Cote d'Ivoire and the Central African Republic. The success or failure of peace agreements depends on signatories and implementers of the agreements (Bill, 2006: 387)

LESSONS LEARNT FROM LIBERIA AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO SECOND CONFLICTS

The events during and after the second conflicts of Liberia and the DRC provide valuable lessons for similar future conflict resolution initiatives. Moreover, lessons from the Liberia and the DRC conflict mediation suggest regional mediation in African conflicts involves numerous state and non-state actors. For a successful mediation, parties in conflicts need to choose preferred mediators for a successful resolution. The will to choose preferred mediators ensures successful ceasefire, peace agreements and the implementation of the agreements. Mediation process is required to bring all parties in conflicts including civil society to take part in the negotiation, peace agreement and peacekeeping for successful conflict resolution in Africa (Anderlini, 2004; Atuobi, 2011).

Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been involved in two conflicts since 2005 and 2009. The DRC conflict was the first to involve the involvement of civil society groups in the negotiations. The negotiation facilitated the formation of a government of national unity which led to general elections in the two countries held in 2005 in Liberia and 2006 in the DRC (Carayannis, 2009; Olonisakin, 2010). The AU and the UN launched peacekeeping missions to protect humanity and to prevent further atrocities in Liberia and the DRC. Peacekeeping in Africa requires more than ceasefire and mandate implementation because of the changing warfare. The need to build the capacity of regional bodies to prevent new conflicts and the intervention mechanisms to deal with the conflicts when they erupt.

The Liberia and the DRC peace agreement experiences showed the value in bringing additional stakeholders such as political parties and civil society actors to the peace negotiation process. Peace agreements were pivotal to ensure international peacekeeping forces were deployed to help sustain the peace and provide the necessary secure environment for security reforms. Post-conflict situations need to be included in the peace agreement, such as in Liberia and DRC. Since no agreement is perfect, mechanisms must be created to create a framework for sustaining the peace process beyond signing the peace agreements in Africa (Nilsson, 2003; Rufanges & Aspa, 2016).

The conflict resolution processes in Liberia and the DRC have created the environment for great lessons to improve conflict resolution in the future. Conflict resolution is usually implemented based on wrong information of causes of conflicts and identifying the main actors in the conflicts for successful conflict resolution. When the wrong conflict resolution initiatives are applied, the situation worsens humanitarian suffering, escalates conflict within a state and defeats the conflict resolution initiatives to end the conflict.

CONCLUSIONS

The conflicts and conflict resolution in Liberia and the DRC have created an environment for great lessons to improve conflict resolution in the future. Conflict resolution is usually implemented based on wrong information of the causes of conflict and the conflict resolution initiatives adopted. The lesson implies any conflict resolution initiative ignoring the root causes of the conflict leads to further confrontations, therefore, institutions need to be strengthened to address the causes of conflicts to lay the foundation for a successful conflict resolution. Secondly, understanding the conflict through the causes of conflict is imperative to the choice of the right conflict resolution initiatives for the prevention of humanitarian suffering and the protraction of the conflict.

Liberia stands as a successful example of regional-body intervention in humanitarian crisis to avert atrocities with the support of the international community and the model needs to be replicated in futures crises. Furthermore, Liberia and the DRC conflict resolution suggests future initiatives in Africa requires the involvement of both state and non-state actors. The mediation processes in Liberia and the DRC suggest parties in conflicts are allowed to choose preferred mediators to ensure success in the negotiation process. The negotiation process employed in the Liberia and the DRC conflict resolution engaged all actors including civil society, a model Africa needs to emulate in future conflict resolution. The inclusion of all parties made the parties committed to the peacekeeping mission and the implementation of the peace agreements for sustainable peace.

The study identified conflict resolution initiatives needed to be based on appropriate information on the causes of conflicts and identifying the main causes in the conflict for appropriate conflict resolution. When wrong causes are identified, wrong resolution initiatives are applied, humanitarian suffering worsens, and the conflict escalates and defeats the conflict resolution initiatives. The overall contribution of the theme to the work is to help make recommendations for implementation of future conflict resolution initiatives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made to guide future conflicts and conflict resolution:

- For a successful conflict resolution, both national and international institutions in war-torn countries need should identify all causes of conflict before any conflict resolution initiatives are employed.

- Parties in conflict need to be allowed to choose preferred third parties for the mediation and the negotiation process. The mediators and the negotiators should be fair and firm in guiding the parties to chart the path of peace.
- Africa Union and other regional bodies such as ECOWAS and SADC should find resources to sustain conflict intervention in Africa than depending on the international community for aid.
- The AU should note that the international community takes time to support Africa in resolving conflicts. Africa should resource peacekeeping missions whilst the international community takes steps to assist Africa resolve her conflict.
- Future peace agreements should factor in power-sharing and post-conflict development initiatives to avoid a second conflict. The peace agreement should be specific on the issue of power-sharing and regime change among actors in conflict to prevent struggles among factions.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The following recommendations are made for future research:

- Future research on conflict resolution must place emphasis on how the conflict resolution initiatives have affected the Liberia and the DRC.
- Future research needs to focus on the role of AU in conflict resolution on the continent. The Liberia and the DRC second conflicts did not see any active involvement of the AU in resolving the conflicts compared to ECOWAS and SADC.
- Further research needs to conduct systematic review of all conflict resolution attempts in Africa to aid future conflict resolution initiative.

REFERENCES

1. Aboagye, F. (1999). ECOMOG: A Sub-Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management, and Peacekeeping in Liberia. Sedco Publishing Limited
2. Abdul-Mumuni, A. (2007). Conflict Resolution in West Africa: Comparative Analysis of Seirra Leone and Liberia [Ekonomiska Institutionen]. <http://www.ep.liu.se/exjobb/eki/2005/impier/007/>
3. Anderlini, S. N. (2004). Peace Negotiations and Agreements. International Alert, 16–32. https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/peace_negotiations.pdf
4. Annan, N. (2014). Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and Prospects. Stability, 3(1). <https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.da>
5. Apuuli, K. P. (2004). The Politics of Conflict Resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Accord. <https://www.ajcr-issues.org/>
6. Atuobi, S. (2011). ECOWAS and Mediation in West Africa: Toward an Enhanced Capacity. Harvard Africa Policy Journal, 7(5), 29–40.
7. Carayannis, T. (2009). The Challenge of Building Sustainable Peace in the DRC (Issue 7). www.hdcentre.org

8. Carrasco, C. M. (2014). Human Rights Violations in Conflict Settings. <https://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/08-Deliverable-10.1.pdf>
9. Chear, D. L., Jannah, K., & Slinger, T. J. D. (2003). Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/af/rls/24149.htm>
10. Chêne, M., & Rheinbay, J. (2015). Overview of Corruption and Anti-- Corruption: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Transparency International. www.U4.no
11. Cheung, S. O. (2010). Mediation for Improved Conflict Resolution. *Journal of Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and Construction*, 2(3), 135–135. [https://doi.org/10.1061/\(asce\)la.1943-4170.0000035](https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)la.1943-4170.0000035)
12. Chissano, J. (2003). Report of the Interim Chairperson on the Peace Process in Liberia (Issue August). <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/report-290803lib.pdf>
13. Dainesa, G., & Laker, J. (2010). Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Issue April). www.ccr.org.za
14. Demirag, E. G. (2014). Comparative Analysis of Peace Process: Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone [Sabanci University, Istanbul]. <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper>
15. Effah-Apenteng, N. (2003). UN Security Council Accra Peace Accorded (Vol. 2003, Issue August). <https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/agreement-ceasefire>
16. Essuman-Johnson, A. (2009). Regional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: A Comparative Analysis of Two African Security Complexes. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 3(10), 409–422. <http://www.academicjournals.org/ajpsir>
17. Evaristus, A. (2019). “Investigating the Causes of Civil Wars in Sub-Saharan Africa” Case Study: The Central African Republic and South Sudan. <https://www.longdom.org/open->
18. Galtung, J. (1973). Theories of Conflict. In *Foreign Affairs*. <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B98GF>
19. Gobewole, S. H. (2015). Corruption in Liberian Government [Walden University]. <https://Scholarworks.walden.edu/dissertations>
20. Gounden, V. (2011). Africa Journal of Conflict Resolution. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 11. <http://library1.nida.ac.th/termpaper6/sd/2554/19755.pdf>
21. Haász, V. (2018). Actor-based Conflict Map on the Second Civil War in Liberia. *Research Gate*, 6, 1–32. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225091177>
22. Harsch, E. (2007). Conflict Resources: from ‘Curse’ to Blessing. *Africa Reneral*. <https://doi.org/10.18356/0ac086f1-en>
23. Hayner, P. (2007). Negotiating Peace in Liberia: Preserving the Possibility for Justice. *Center For Humaniterain Dialoqu*, November, 32. www.hdcentre.org

24. Herbert, S. (2014). Conflict Analysis of Liberia. In GSDRC, University of Birmingham (Issue February). www.gsdrc.org
25. Holmes, R. (2017). Incentives for Implementation? The Relationship between Biased versus Neutral Mediators and the Degree of Peace Agreement Implementation Rebecca [Uppsala University]. In PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases (Vol. 9, Issue 5). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tmaid.2020.101607>
26. Ikejiaku, B. V. (2009). The Relationship between Poverty, Conflict and Development. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, 2(1). <https://doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v2n1p15>
27. Isajiw, W. W. (2000). Approaches to Ethnic Conflict Resolution: Paradigms and Principles. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 24(1), 105–124. [https://doi.org/10.1016/s0147-1767\(99\)00025-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/s0147-1767(99)00025-5)
28. Ngoy-Kangoy, H. K. (2007). The Political Role of the Ethnic Factor around Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 7(2), 219–238.
29. Karbo, T., & Mutisi, M. (2012). *Ethnic Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)* (pp. 381–402). Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-0448-4_15
30. Kasanda, P. L. (1999). Ceasefire Agreement (Lusaka Agreement) (Vol. 21637). https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_990710_LusakaAgreement.pdf
31. Kieh Jr., G. K. (2009). The Roots of the Second Liberian Civil War. *International Journal on World Peace*, 26(1), 7–30. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20752871>
32. Kodi, M. (2008). Corruption and Governance in the DRC. In Tshwan. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-005-1255-z>
33. Koko, S. (2016). The Role of Civil Society in Conflict Resolution in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1998-2006: An Appraisal. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 16(1), 111–137.
34. De Koning, R. (2009). Artisanal Mining and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/76831CA714EC58E449>
35. Kotia, E. W. (2015). *Ghana Armed Forces in Lebanon and Liberia Peace Operations*. London, In Lexington Books.
36. Lema, A. (2000). Causes of Civil War in Rwanda: The Weight of History and Socio-Cultural Structures. *Ethnicity Kills?* 68–86. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333977354_4
37. McCandless, E., & Karbo, T. (2011). Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa: A Reader. In University of Peace. http://www.upeace.org/pdf%5CREADER_webpages.pdf
38. McHenry, K. (2010). Hungry for Peace: How You Can Help End Poverty and War with Food Not Bombs. *The Economic Times of India*.
39. Michael, R. L. (2004). How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases. International Organization-The IO Foundation. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830458102>
40. Momodu, S. (2018). Second Congo Civil War (1996-1997). *Black Past*. <https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/second-congo-civil-war-1996-1997/>

41. Molemele, N. L. (2015). Factors Which Prolong Civil Conflict in Africa: The Case of Angola, Factors Which Prolong Civil Conflict in Africa: The Case of Angola [City University of New York]. <https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/>
42. Momodu, S. (2018). Second Congo Civil War (1996-1997). Black Past. <https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/second-congo-civil-war-1996-1997/>
43. Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). Power and Ideology in International Politics. Alfred A. Knopf. <https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3579&context=etd>
44. Mpangala, G. P. (2004). Conflict Resolution and Peace building in Africa as a process: A Case Studies of Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. An International Conference on Africa's Road Map of Development and Self-Reliance: Reality or Myth. 1–26. <https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/5710/2984.pdf>
45. Neef, M. (2017). Local Rules? The Practices of Conflict Resolution by United Nations in Liberia. <https://www.africaportal.org/publications/>
46. Nilsson, D. (2003). Crafting a Secure Peace: Evaluating Liberia's Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2003. Uppsala University. <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Crafting>
47. Obi, C. (2012). Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte D'Ivoire. African Security ISSN: <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uafs20>
48. Ogechi, D. (2008). The Role of External Actors in Management of Internal Conflict: a Case Study of Democratic Republic of Congo (1997-2007). In Tax Foundation (Issue October). <http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/17806>
49. Olonisakin, F. (2010). ECOWAS and West African Conflicts: The Dynamics of Conflicts and Crises. In CODESRIA and Consortium for Development Partnership (CDD). <https://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/>
50. Paglia, P. (2007). Ethnicity and Tribalism: Are These the Root Causes of the Sudanese Civil Conflicts? African Conflicts and the Role of Ethnicity: A Case Study of Sudan. Political Science. <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Ethnicity>
51. Patrick, V., Phuong Kreutzer, P., &Tino. (2011). Talking Peace: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Security, Dispute Resolution, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Liberia [University of California, Berkeley]. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1874025
52. Potts, A., Myer, K., & Roberts, L. (2011). Measuring Human Rights Violations in a Conflict-affected Country: Results from a Nationwide Cluster Survey in Central African Republic. *Conflict and Health*, 5(1), 4. <https://doi.org/10.1186/1752-1505-5-4>
53. Redick, C. (2009). No More Blood Must Run: An Analysis of Ethnic Violence in the Second Congo Conflict No More Blood Must Run: An Analysis of Ethnic Violence in the Second Congo Conflict. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/268093796.pdf>

54. Reid, K. (2017, July). DRC conflict: Facts, FAQs, and how to help | World Vision. World Vision. <https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/drc-conflict-facts>
55. Rocha, P. (2009). Dialogue and Mediation Handbook (C. Onwualu (ed.); Chinelo On). Immaculate Brand Mediation. <https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/07>
56. Rogier, E. (2004). The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: A Critical Overview. Challenges of Peace Implementation. The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 25–42. <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/>
57. Rufanges, C. J., & Aspa, J. M. R. (2016). Democratic Republic of Congo: A Review of 20 years of war (Issue April). https://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/alerta/alerta/RDCongo_20AnosGuerra_I.pdf
58. Schellenberg, J. A. (1996). Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice. State University of New York Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3790868>.
59. Schlein, L. (2020, October). Massive Human Rights Violations in DRC Linked to Armed Conflicts, Report Finds | Voice of America - English. VOA. <https://www.voanews.com/africa/massive-human-rights-violationsz>
60. Sherman, J. (2006, March). The Challenge of Ethnicity and Conflict. Liberian Times. <https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/liberia/2006/0316ethnicity.htm>
61. Bjarnadóttir, E. S. (2017). Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo A study of “new wars” [University of Iceland]. https://skemman.is/bitstream/1946/28947/1/MARitgerð_ESB.pdf
62. Smidt, H. M. (2020). United Nations Peacekeeping Locally: Enabling Conflict Resolution, Reducing Communal Violence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 64(2–3), 344–372. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719859631>
63. Tersoo, I. J., & Ikem O. C. (2014). Sustainable Conflict Management Mechanism in Africa: Issues and Challenges for Development. In *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* (Vol. 4, Issue 7).
64. United Nations. (2002). Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Pretoria Agreement) | UN Peacemaker. Peacemakers. <https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-agreementontransition2002>
65. Venugopalan, H. (2016). Understanding the Conflict in Congo. *ORF ISSE*, 139. <https://orfonline.org/wp-content/>
66. Wanis, A., & Ghais, S. (2014). *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice* (P. T. Coleman, M. Deutsch, & E. C. Marcus (eds.); Third Edit). Jossey-Base. <https://www.worldcat.org/title/handbook-of-conflict->
67. Whitfield, T. (2010). Practice Series External Actors in Mediation (Issue February). http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/35Externalactorsinmediation-MPS.pdf
68. Yoroms, G. (2016). The Second Liberian Peace Process and the Problem of Post Conflict Peace Building in West Africa: Some Contending Issues and Interests. In *IFRA Special Research Issue Vol. 1* (pp. 79–92). IFRA-Nigeria. <https://doi.org/10.4000/books.ifra.803>

